4 time-in particular, genetics-is more intimate and complex and, at the same time, more disturbing. 5 In the same vein, Roberto Esposito does not hesitate to write that Nazism "is actually biology realized." 6 This way of thinking clearly leaves aside everything in biology that is not related to the training of bodies or the regulating of conduct and instead reveals the reserve of possibilities inscribed in the living being itself. It is a dimension confirmed by the revolutionary discoveries of molecular and cellular biology today. These discoveries, which are largely ignored by philosophers, are the very ones able to renew the political question.
This can be demonstrated via two central categories. The first is the epigenetic. The second is cloning, with its two fields of operation: asexual reproduction and regeneration (or selfhealing).
I am well aware that I am dealing with explosive notions here, notions that more often than not function as the privileged tools of contemporary biopolitics and its industrial, biologist and eugenicist offshoots. Nonetheless, it is my contention that these categories allow us to reconsider the antibiological bias of philosophy. 5 . Agamben, Homo Sacer, ; hereafter abbreviated HS.
What bias? Contemporary philosophy bears the marks of a primacy of symbolic life over biological life that has not been criticized, nor deconstructed.
Symbolic life is that which exceeds biological life, conferring meaning on it. If refers to spiritual life, life as a "work of art," life as care for the self and the shaping of being, peeling our presence in the world away from its solely obscure, natural dimension.
Foucault's concept of body and Agamben's concept of bare life bear witness to this unquestioned splitting of the concept of life. Paradoxically, they expel the biological that is supposed to constitute their core-and it thereby becomes their unthinkable residue.
Let's go back to the phrase in The History of Sexuality: "modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question." Foucault is swift to equate "existence as a living being" with the body: "The purpose of the present study is in fact to show how deployments of power are directly connected to the body" (HSI, p. 151).
The body acts as a hyphen connecting "anatomy, the biological, the functional" and is the lowest common denominator in the various determinants that supposedly describe the specificity of the "living being": the "fact of living," "to be a living species in a living world" -having conditions of existence, life probabilities; individual and collective health (HSI, pp. 151, 142 ).
Yet it is immediately clear that in fact the body is 1) all and part of a list in which the biological is defined diffusely: "bodies, functions, physiological processes, sensations, and 6 pleasures" or as "organs, somatic localizations, functions, anatomo-physiological systems, sensations, and pleasures"; 2) that it both is and is not reducible to the biological. The biological is said to be "what is most material and most vital" in bodies (HSI, pp. 152, 152) . How should we understand this? That in the body there is something more and less vital, more and less material? If so, then that means that the "less vital" and "less material" is that which is incorporeal in the body: the spiritual or the symbolic.
The same problem arises for the bare life that Agamben borrows from Walter Benjamin (bloss Leben) and that constitutes a central category in his analysis of the biopolitical. In many respects, bare life seems to merge with biological life. It relates to the "simple fact of living" and refers to "natural life" (for which there is neither good nor evil but only "the pleasant and the painful")-"biological life as such" (HS, p. 1, 3). It is often described as "pure" or "simple": "simple fact of living," "simple natural life" (HS, pp. 182, 3) . But it is also synonymous with the body: "simple living body," docile body ("power penetrates subjects' very bodies") (HS, p. 3, 5) . But here we find the same confusion. As
Agamben writes, "Bare life . . . now dwells in the biological body of every living being" (HS, p. 140). Once again, therefore, there is space for something other than bare life in the biological body. And in what, then, does that which is not in the bare life of this body consist? More precisely, we come to see, bare life is that which lives in the biological body without being reducible to it-its symbol.
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It must be said, the biologists are of little help with this problem. Not one has deemed it necessary to respond to the philosophers or to efface the assimilation of biology to biologism. It seems inconceivable that they do not know Foucault, that they have never encountered the word biopolitical. Fixated on the two poles of ethics and evolutionism, they do not think through the way in which the science of the living being could-and from this point on should-unsettle the equation between biological determination and political normalization. The ethical shield with which biological discourse is surrounded today does not suffice to define the space of a theoretical disobedience to accusations of complicity among the science of the living being, capitalism, and the technological manipulation of life.
The Gap between the Living Being and Itself
In order to lay out the foundations of the discussion would require asking (is this sentence correct ?) contemporary biology "permission," to use Georges Canguilhem's phrase, to identify its "fundamental philosophical concepts." "What is most material and most vital in bodies" must be thought as an interactive space, a formative and transformative dynamic of organic identity that operates within the economy of the living being itself, not outside of it. The gap that is opened between the living being and itself through the double interface between regimes of transmission and regimes of reproduction is a paradoxical memory gap in that it reveals the now fundamental shifting between the irreversibility and reversibility of difference.
Epigenetics
First and foremost, epigenetics allows us to question the definition of the living being as a set of functions; secondly, it makes it possible to question the definition of the living being as a program; thirdly, it blurs the dividing line between the fact of living and the elaboration of a mode of being. The word epigenetic comes from the noun epigenesis (from the Greek, epi, above, next to, and genesis; epigenesis thus literally means "above or next to genesis"), which appeared in the seventeenth century in reference to a biological theory that claimed that the embryo develops through gradual differentiation of parts, thereby opposing preformationism. By contrast, preformationism assumes that the living organism is wholly constituted in advance, as a miniature, in the seed. The notion of epigenetic history also refers to a type of heredity, that is, once again, a specific mode of transmission of information from one generation to the next, hence the importance of its phylogenetic dimension. In Evolution in Four Dimensions, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb, who go so far as to speak of the "epigenetic turn" of our era, emphasize the fact that genetic transmission is not the sole mode of hereditary transmission: "The idea that DNA alone is responsible for all the hereditary differences between individuals is now so firmly fixed in people's minds that it is difficult to rid them of it"; the idea that "information transmitted through nongenetic inheritance systems is of real importance for understanding heredity and evolution" is not yet accepted.
10 And yet, epigenetic heredity is indisputable today. Epigenetic modifications in fact have the particular quality of being heritable from one generation of cell to the next, 11 which renders the idea of evolution more complex and reveals its multiple dimensions.
Lastly, the notion of epigenetic history relates to the way in which the modifications of the master of the genes depend not only on internal and structural factors, like those mentioned above, but also on environmental factors.
So the epigenetic also provides genetic material with a means of reacting to the 11 . This occurs during mitosis-or even over several generations of organisms during meiosis-even if the cause has disappeared. 12 born of control mice (which did not receive the additional food) had yellow or dappled fur.
There is therefore a transmissible memory of changes due to environment.
Thomas Jenuwein, director of the Department of Immunobiology at the Max Planck Institute, suggests that:
The difference between genetics and epigenetics can probably be compared to the difference between writing and reading a book. Once a book is written, the text (the genes or DNA: stored information) will be the same in all the copies distributed to the interested audience. However, each individual reader of a given book may interpret the story differently, with varying emotions and projections as they continue to unfold the chapters. In a very similar manner, epigenetics would allow different interpretations of a fixed template (the book or genetic code) and result in different readings, dependent upon the variable conditions under which the template is interrogated.
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The living being does not simply perform a program. If the structure of the living being is an intersection between a given and a construction, it becomes difficult to establish a strict border between natural necessity and self-invention. 
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The challenge that cloning makes to the category of difference is not related primarily to the copy, to the threat of an eternal return of the same, for the clone will never be a faithful and perfect copy:
Epigenesis is a powerful determinant in development […] Indeed, the radical novelty of the concept of the living being elaborated today by biology is paradoxically related to the return of cellular potentials, present among primitive animals and that were thought to have disappeared, or at least weakened, among so-called higher order animals. These potentials are precisely asexual reproduction and regeneration, both of which represent ancient forms of life realized by the state of the art technologies of therapeutic and reproductive cloning. Biotechnological innovation-far from being a mere instrumentalization, manipulation, or mutilation-thereby realizes a memory, that of the living beings erased within us. The posthuman is thus also the prehuman. On this dimension of return to nature of the technology, not a word has ever been said by any philosopher.
Repairing, Regenerating: The Interplay of Possibilities
In the course of evolution, regeneration-that possibility of naturally repairing all or part of the body-has largely been lost among mammals. This is why the discovery of stem cells-able to repair, reform, and regenerate organs and damaged tissue-forces us to look two ways at once, both to the future and to the past: to the future, that is, towards the perfecting of technology destined for the medical use of these cells; and to the past, as regeneration is a very ancient property, connected to primitive animals, such as hydra, planarians and starfish.
In many ways, advances in biology are bringing back, or renewing, a period that was believed to be past. Jean-Claude Ameisen interprets this interplay of return as a play of possibilities. Possibilities that must be "drawn from their slumber": We "could try to renew ourselves and to become perpetual starting from our own stem cells, starting from the spores that sleep in our body." 
